are entitled, then, to conclude that they are *intended* to effect these purposes. We say *intended;* for while man may perform acts fitted to produce a given end without knowing it, there is room for no such distinction in reference to the doings of the omniscient and omnipresent God. We are convinced that those skilful arrangements, general and particular, *by* which mankind are trained to outward decency of deportment, and restrained from evil, are all contemplated and designed. But would such a system of aids and checks have been required in an unfallen world ? Would it have been permitted in a world in which all was pure and holy ?

Let us recall the process by which it is demonstrated that a God exists. It is by a brief argument, founded on the design which everywhere meets the eye. But, as we survey the phenomena that indicate design, we find them indicating not only design in general, but to a special end in reference to mankind. Some of them have evidently a benevolent purpose, as the beautiful revolution of the seasons, providing sustenance for God's creatures. Others just as palpably have it in view to keep men externally virtuous when virtuous principle might fail, to restrain evil when the hatred of sin might exercise little or no influence, and to arrest the consequences which might follow from human folly. Prove to us that God's providence is so ordered as to institute a special provision for the wants of his creatures, and we shall prove, by a similar and as large an induction of facts, that it has also respect to the limiting and correcting of human vice and folly.

The argument may be otherwise stated. Lord Brougham, in his Natural Theology, when proving that there is benevolent design in the works of God, argues in the following way:—

^ Had I to accomplish this purpose, I would have used some such means; or, had I used these means, I should have thought

I was accomplishing some such purpose. Perceiving the adaptation of the means to the end, the inference is, that some being has acted as we should ourselves act, and with the same views."*

Suppose, for instance, that it was our design to give an easy and pleasant motion to a certain member of the body, could we have used a more suitable instrumentality than that actually employed in the joints, with the attached muscles of the human frame ?

* Nat. Theo., p. i. § 3.